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Abstract 
Restricting one’s access to temptations (precommitment) facilitates the achievement of long-
term goals. The sophisticated impulsiveness model of precommitment posits that impulsive 
agents who are aware that they are impulsive should show the strongest preference for 
precommitment. Empirically however, two central predictions of this theoretical notion 
remained untested: whether impulsiveness causally drives the demand for precommitment and 
whether the willingness to precommit depends on metacognitive awareness of one’s 
impulsiveness. Here, we tested these predictions in three independent experiments. Participants 
performed a delay discounting task in which they could precommit to larger-later rewards. The 
results of Experiment 1 provide causal evidence that reducing impulse control capacities 
increases precommitment demand. Moreover, Experiments 2 and 3 support the hypothesis that 
metacognitive awareness of one’s impulsiveness moderates the relationship between 
impulsiveness and precommitment. Together, our data put the sophisticated impulsiveness 
model of precommitment on strong empirical foundations. 
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Introduction 
Impulse control enables biological agents, including humans, to resist short-term 
temptations for the sake of long-term goods. However, the ability to control impulses is limited 
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Humans and animals may therefore have developed strategies 
that protect against impulse control failures. One such strategy is to prevent access to desired 
short-term temptations by making a binding choice for long-term rewards (“precommitment”) 
(O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; Strotz, 1956; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). Due to the potential of 
precommitment for protecting impulsive individuals against control failures, precommitment 
devices have been designed for both economic and clinical purposes to counteract 
impulsiveness. For example, rates of saving for retirement can be increased by inaccessible 
investment funds (David Laibson, Repetto, & Tobacman, 1998), or pathological gamblers can 
benefit from slot machines requiring to pre-set a maximum loss limit (Ladouceur, Blaszczynski, 
& Lalande, 2012). Thus, precommitment promises to be an effective means to promote impulse 
control, particularly in impulsive agents (for a review, see Bryan, Karlan, & Nelson, 2010).  
Theoretical models posit that the demand for precommitment essentially results from 
impulsiveness (Kurth-Nelson & Redish, 2010, 2012; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; Rachlin & 
Green, 1972; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). In intertemporal decision-making, impulsive agents are 
present-biased and overvalue immediate over delayed rewards (hyperbolic discounting) 
(Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002; D. Laibson, 1997; Strotz, 1956). With present 
bias, agents can show time inconsistent preferences. In other words, impulsive agents may 
change their preference from originally higher-valued later rewards to originally lower-valued 
sooner rewards when the time of the delivery of the sooner reward is getting closer. To avoid 
such preference reversals, impulsive agents should show a demand for committing to the long-
term reward option. More elaborate accounts reserve this demand only for sophisticated agents 
who are aware of their own impulsiveness, but not for naïve agents (D. Laibson, 2015; 
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O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). In the following, we will refer to such an account of 
precommitment as “sophisticated impulsiveness” model. 
To the extent that it is available, empirical evidence for these theoretical assumptions is 
mixed. While some studies support the claim that impulsive individuals benefit most from 
precommitment (Ashraf, Karlan, & Yin, 2006; Ladouceur et al., 2012), others found no 
evidence that impulsive populations such as individuals with drug addiction or low-income 
groups particularly benefit from precommitment devices (Fuller & Roth, 1979; Venti & Wise, 
1990). Crucially, previous empirical studies only assessed precommitment demand in low-
impulsiveness versus high-impulsiveness groups (Bryan et al., 2010), but such correlative 
analyses do not allow drawing conclusions about the causal relationship between impulsiveness 
and precommitment. In other words, it is unclear whether impulsiveness causally drives the 
willingness to restrict access to the source of temptation, as claimed by the sophisticated 
impulsiveness framework. Moreover, also the sophistication assumption, i.e. that 
precommitment demand depends on the match between perceived and actual impulse control, 
has not been empirically tested. O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) consider the fact that people use 
precommitment devices as evidence for sophistication, but it has never been shown that 
sophistication leads to precommitment. 
Due to the mixed evidence for central assumptions of the sophisticated impulsiveness 
account, alternative models of precommitment have been developed. At variance with the idea 
that impulsiveness drives precommitment demand, an alternative account posits that 
precommitment should not be chosen by impulsive but by patient agents because the decision 
to precommit itself requires impulse control (Noor, 2007). Due to the lack of conclusive 
empirical evidence, however, it is not possible to decide between these conflicting accounts on 
the motives of precommitment decisions. 
Here, we empirically tested two central assumptions of the sophisticated impulsiveness 
account of precommitment that have been challenged by alternative accounts. First, we tested 
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the causal role of impulse control for motivating precommitment decisions by assessing the 
impact of experimentally enhanced impulsiveness on precommitment demand (Experiment 1). 
Second, we examined the hypothesized moderating role of sophistication. Thus, we tested 
whether impulsive agents who are aware of their impulse control deficits show a stronger 
demand for precommitment than patient or naïve agents (Experiments 2 and 3). We find 
evidence in support of both assumptions. Our findings suggest that the sophisticated 




In Experiment 1, we administered an intertemporal decision task that allowed measuring 
both impulsiveness and the willingness to precommit within the same experimental task 
(Crockett et al., 2013; Soutschek et al., 2017). To establish a causal link between impulse 
control and precommitment demand, we experimentally manipulated impulse control 
capacities. Prior to the precommitment task one group of participants had to perform a 3-back 
task. This task is cognitively taxing because it requires continuous maintenance and updating 
of three items in working memory (Braver et al., 1997). As control task, another group of 
participants performed a 0-back task that did not impose any working memory demands. High 
working memory demands were previously found to impair impulse control processes in 
intertemporal choice relative to a less demanding control condition (Blain, Hollard, & 
Pessiglione, 2016). We note that we do not make any strong theoretical assumptions about the 
nature of such a depletion-like effect and that the theoretical claims formulated by the ego 
depletion framework (Baumeister & Vohs, 2016; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010) 
were controversially debated recently (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Hagger et al., 2016; 
Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014). Instead, we only assume that having dealt with high 
demands on executive control can impair the exertion of control processes in a subsequent task 
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(Blain et al., 2016; Dang, Bjorklund, & Backstrom, 2017). Impairing executive control (and 
thus impulse control) allowed us to distinguish between theoretical accounts on the causal 
relationship between impulsiveness and precommitment. According to the sophisticated 
impulsiveness account, impulsiveness enhances the demand for precommitment, such that 
reducing impulse control capacities should increase preference for precommitment. In direct 
opposition, if precommitment itself requires impulse control (Noor, 2007), experimentally 
reduced impulse control should result in fewer precommitment decisions.  
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Seventy-nine heterosexual males (mean age = 22.4 year, age range 18-33 years) 
volunteered in the study after having given informed consent. Participants were reimbursed 
with 50 Swiss francs for their participation. The study was approved by the local ethics 
committee. Power analyses suggested that 37 participants per group (thus a total of 74 
participants) were required to detect a statistical effect (alpha = 5%) with a probability of 80%, 
given the effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.48) from a previous study manipulating intertemporal 
choices with working memory demands (Blain et al., 2016). 
 
Stimuli and task design 
Precommitment task. To measure the individual willingness to precommit, we applied 
a decision task we had already used in previous studies (Crockett et al., 2013; Soutschek et al., 
2017). Participants made choices between immediately available smaller sooner (SS) and larger 
later (LL) rewards that were delivered after temporal delays of 4-10 s. Due to the relatively 
short delays, we used erotic stimuli as primary reinforcers consumable at the time of delivery 
instead of monetary rewards (Prevost, Pessiglione, Metereau, Clery-Melin, & Dreher, 2010). 
To approximately match the subjective value of SS and LL rewards across participants, all 
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participants rated the attractiveness of 300 pictures of women in lingerie on a Likert-scale of 0-
10 seven days before the main experimental session. We used these ratings to construct 
individualized stimulus sets by first removing all pictures rated as unattractive (ratings of 0 or 
1) and then splitting the remaining pictures at each individual’s median. We defined pictures 
above and below the median as LL and SS rewards, respectively. We never presented the same 
picture more than once in the main experimental session to avoid saturation effects. 
To measure individual differences in impulsiveness and willingness to precommit, the 
task comprised two conditions: precommitment and willpower (Figure 1). In the 
precommitment condition, participants first decided in a pre-delay phase (4 s) to either have a 
free choice between the SS and the LL option during a subsequent delay phase, or to precommit 
to the LL option. If participants precommitted to the LL reward, the SS option was not available 
for selection during the delay phase, after which the image for the LL reward was presented. In 
contrast, if participants preferred having free choice, they could choose the SS option during 
the indicated temporal delay. If they chose this option, the SS reward was presented 
immediately. If they did not, the LL reward was presented automatically after the delay phase. 
Participants indicated their choice by pressing the left control key (for the option shown on the 
left side of the screen) or the right control key (for the option shown on the right side of the 
screen) on a standard keyboard. The assignment of options to screen sides was counterbalanced 
across participants. Depending on participants’ choices, either the SS (immediately after 
selection) or the LL reward (after the delay) was presented for 2.5 s, followed by a variable 
inter-trial interval (ITI) in which a fixation cross was presented on the centre of the screen. If 
participants chose the LL option, the length of the ITI was 1.5 s, whereas in case of SS choices 
the remaining duration of the terminated delay phase was added to these 1.5 s. This ensured 
that participants could not finish the task faster by choosing the SS reward, and we informed 
participants about this procedure before the start of the experiment. 
Sophisticated impulsiveness and precommitment 8 
 
The willpower condition provided a measure of impulsiveness independent of the 
possibility to precommit. Willpower trials started directly with a delay phase (omitting the pre-
delay phase), where the SS reward was available for immediate selection and the LL reward 
was presented automatically after the indicated temporal delay. This delay phase terminated 
immediately if participants chose the SS option (in this case, the remaining part of the 
terminated delay phase was again added to the ITI). Thus, the willpower condition assessed 
participants’ ability to suppress the temptation to choose the immediately available SS reward 
while waiting for the LL reward.  
N-back task. Participants performed a letter version of the n-back task in either a 3-back 
(depletion group; N = 43) or a 0-back (control group; N = 36) condition (Braver et al., 1997). 
The sample size incidentally happened to be larger in the 3-back than the 0-back condition 
because the majority of no-shows (who took part only in the first session for the picture rating 
task but did not show up for the main experimental session) had been assigned to the 0-back 
condition. In both conditions, participants were presented a stream of letters (b, c, d, g, p, t, w). 
To increase task difficulty, we used letters that were phonologically similar in German 
(Soutschek & Schubert, 2016; Soutschek, Strobach, & Schubert, 2013). In the 3-back condition, 
participants were instructed to press the space bar on a keyboard if the currently presented letter 
was identical to the letter presented three trials before, such that participants permanently had 
to maintain and update three letters in working memory. In the 0-back condition, in contrast, 
participants were instructed to respond to a letter defined at the start of a block. Thus, the 0-
back task required no updating and less maintenance (only one instead of three letters) than the 
3-back task. Each trial of the n-back task started with the presentation of a letter for 2000 ms, 
followed by a fixation cross (1500 ms). If the n-back letter was a target stimulus, the response 
had to be executed before the start of the next trial. 
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Procedure 
Experiment 1 followed a pre-test/post-test design that allowed assessing how the 
working memory manipulation (3-back vs. 0-back) changed behaviour in the precommitment 
task (Figure 2A). In the pre-test session, participants first performed six blocks (each 6 trials, 
with balanced numbers of 4, 7, and 10 s delay trials) of the precommitment task (three blocks 
of the precommitment and of the willpower condition each). To increase the distinctiveness of 
the conditions, the frames of the choice options were shown in different colours (the assignment 
of conditions to colours was counterbalanced across participants). Moreover, before the start of 
a block, a cue presented for 2 s alerted participants to the upcoming condition (e.g., “blue task” 
for the precommitment condition). After the pre-test, participants performed three blocks (each 
62 trials) of either the 3-back (working memory group) or 0-back (control group) task in order 
to manipulate their impulse control capacities. After the n-back task, participants were 
presented again with six blocks of the precommitment task (post-test). 
 
Statistical analysis 
In the precommitment task, we analysed differences in the percentage of 
precommitment decisions for the precommitment condition and the percentage of LL reward 
deliveries for the willpower condition. As recommended for pre-test/post-test designs (Dugard 
& Todman, 1995), we assessed behaviour in the post-test session with an analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) where we entered the individual pre-test data as covariate to control for pre-
existing baseline differences. In the n-back task, we analysed performance rates, defined as the 
difference between hit rate (percentage of correctly detected targets) and false alarms 
(percentage of erroneous responses to non-targets). All analyses were run with IBM SPSS 22. 
The alpha threshold was set to 5%. 
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Results 
We first evaluated the effectiveness of the working memory manipulation in the n-back 
task. Participants showed a significantly lower performance rate in the 3-back (67.0% correct 
responses) compared with the 0-back (99.9%) condition, t(77) = 9.50, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 
2.22, indicating that the 3-back task was mentally more demanding than the 0-back task (Figure 
2B). In addition, we replicated previous findings (Crockett et al., 2013; Soutschek et al., 2017) 
that in the pre-test participants obtain more LL rewards in the precommitment (69%) than in 
the willpower (61%) condition, t(78) = 5.21, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.61, consistent with the 
view that the possibility to precommit improves self-control.  
Next, we tested how performing the 3-back vs. the 0-back task changed decisions in the 
precommitment and willpower conditions. For this purpose, we computed ANCOVAs on the 
post-test data (percentage of precommitment decisions in the precommitment condition and 
percentage of LL reward deliveries in the willpower condition) with the factors Group (0-back 
vs. 3-back), Condition (Precommitment vs. Willpower), and Delay (Table 1 and Table 2). In 
addition, we added mean choices from the pre-test as covariate to control for individual baseline 
differences. This analysis yielded a significant Group × Condition interaction, F(1, 75) = 6.44, 
p = 0.01, eta2partial = 0.079, suggesting that performing the 3-back relative to the 0-back 
condition differentially affected decision-making in the precommitment and willpower 
conditions. By extension, this finding cannot be explained by the assumption that the 3-back 
task demands generally changed the value of SS or LL rewards, because in this case we should 
have observed the same result pattern in the precommitment and the willpower condition. 
To test whether working memory demands differentially affected behaviour in the 
willpower and the precommitment conditions, we computed separate ANCOVAs for these 
conditions, which included all factors as the omnibus ANCOVA reported above except the 
factor Condition (precommitment vs. willpower). In the willpower condition, a significant 
Group × Delay interaction, F(2, 152) = 6.82, p = 0.001, eta2partial = 0.082, indicated that 
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performing the 3-back task reduced the capacity to wait for LL rewards as function of delay 
length. Post-hoc tests revealed that the 3-back, relative to the 0-back, task resulted in fewer LL 
outcomes only for a delay of 4 s, t(76) = 2.64, p = 0.01, not of 7 or 10 s, both t < 1, both p > 
0.59 (Figure 2C and Table 3). The impact of previous 3-back (relative to 0-back) performance 
might be more pronounced for shorter than for longer delays due to floor effects, i.e. cognitive 
demands could not (statistically significantly) further reduce LL outcomes at longer delays due 
to the already relatively low number of LL outcomes at these delays. In fact, in the baseline 
pre-test session 20% of all participants never waited for the LL reward at delays of 10 s, 
compared to only 1% and 5% at delays of 4 s and 7 s, respectively. Similarly, in the 
precommitment task 4%, 8%, and 19% of all participants never waited for the LL outcome at 
the delays of 4, 7, and 10 s, respectively. When removing these 26 participants from the 
analysis, the main effect of Group showed a trend-level effect, F(1, 50) = 3.49, p = 0.068, 
eta2partial = 0.065, while the Group × Delay was clearly above the statistical threshold, F(2, 100) 
< 1, p = 0.54, eta2partial = 0.012. When controlling for floor effects, there was thus no longer 
evidence that group effects on willpower are stronger on shorter than on longer delays.   
In addition, when conducting the same analysis (including all participants) on the 
decision time until participants made a choice for the SS reward, we observed a main effect of 
Group, F(1, 76) = 4.88, p = 0.03, eta2partial = 0.060, but no Group × Delay interaction, F < 1, p 
= 0.48, eta2partial = 0.010. Specifically, in line with the assumption of impaired impulse control, 
participants more quickly gave in to choosing the SS reward after 3-back (mean = 2.46 s) 
compared with after 0-back (mean = 3.23 s) performance. Taken together, the findings of less 
LL outcomes in the 3-back group is consistent with previous results that performing a highly 
demanding working memory task impairs the subsequent exertion of impulse control in 
intertemporal choice (Blain et al., 2016).  
In the precommitment condition, increased working memory load increased demand for 
precommitment with long delays. Specifically, a significant Group × Delay interaction, F(2, 
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152) = 5.22, p = 0.006, eta2partial = 0.064, was qualified by participants making more 
precommitment decisions after performing the 3-back compared with the 0-back task for delays 
of 10 s, t(76) = 2.22, p = 0.03, but not for delays of 4 or 7 s, both t < 1, both p > 0.37 (Figure 
2D and Table 4). We note, though, that the Group × Condition × Delay interaction was not 
significant in the omnibus ANCOVA, F(2, 150) < 1, p = 0.81, eta2partial = 0.003, such that our 
results do not allow concluding that working memory demands affect behaviour in the 
precommitment versus willpower condition at different delays. Nevertheless, the opposite 
directions of the effects in these conditions suggest that performing a demanding working 
memory task reduces the ability to exert impulse control and at the same time increases the 
propensity to precommit in order to avoid impulse control failures. 
Lastly, we tested whether post-test minus pre-test changes in precommitment (at delays 
of 10 s, i.e. where we had observed significant effects) co-vary with post-test minus pre-test 
changes in LL outcomes in the willpower condition (at delays of 4 s). However, this correlation 
was not significant, r = -0.10, p = 0.40, suggesting that changes in willpower alone are not 
sufficient to explain changes in precommitment behaviour.   
 
Discussion 
When their ability to resist temptations was impaired after high mental effort, 
participants showed a stronger preference for precommitment to the LL reward option. They 
might thus have used the possibility to precommit to compensate their enhanced impulsiveness. 
This assumption is in line with the impulsiveness hypothesis according to which individuals 
should show a stronger willingness to restrict their access to the tempting option with increasing 
impulse control deficits. The finding that precommitment increased rather than decreased after 
mental effort exertion is at variance with the alternative claim that precommitment requires 
impulse control (Noor, 2007).  
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Our findings converges with a previous report showing that those who are more 
impulsive are more willing to precommit (Wertenbroch, 1998). However, this study allowed 
only correlative inferences on the relationship between impulsiveness and precommitment, 
whereas our experimental manipulations provide causal evidence that increased impulsiveness 
motivates precommitment decisions. 
Our finding of increased impulsivity after working memory demands replicates previous 
reports (Blain et al., 2016). However, one might argue that the observed result pattern can 
alternatively be explained by a stronger desire to relinquish control after the 3-back compared 
with the 0-back condition. According to this view, participants make more SS reward choices 
in the willpower condition after 3-back (relative to 0-back) performance due to the increased 
costs of resisting the SS reward (Burger, 1989; Saunders, Milyavskaya, & Inzlicht, 2015). This 
account assumes that the behaviours in both the precommitment and the willpower condition 
are the consequence of lower perceived control, whereas we interpreted the lower number of 
LL outcomes in the willpower condition as reflecting failures in objective impulse control. 
Crucially, however, both approaches agree that precommitment is motivated by the lower 
perceived likelihood of receiving LL outcomes after high mental demands, such that they both 
support the claims of the sophisticated impulsiveness account. We note though that the non-
significant result of the correlation analysis suggests variation in precommitment and willpower 
to have at least partially different sources. This appears to favour the assumption that the fewer 
LL outcomes in the willpower condition reflect objective impulse control failures, whereas only 
precommitment choices are driven by perceived impulsiveness (which depends on both 
objective impulsiveness and an individual’s metacognitive skills). Taken together, we thus 
believe that the most parsimonious explanation for our results is that strong working memory 
demands impaired the ability to exert self-control in intertemporal choice. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 2, we tested whether the impact of impulsiveness on precommitment (as 
suggested by Experiment 1) is moderated by agents’ metacognitive awareness of their 
impulsiveness. In addition to the precommitment task employed in Experiment 1, we therefore 
assessed participants’ impulse control beliefs as measure of sophistication. Thereby, we tested 
the prediction of the sophisticated impulsiveness account that sophisticated impulsive agents 
show the strongest demand for restricting their choice options to avoid impulse control failures.  
Economic models make the minimal assumption that precommitment should be more 
strongly preferred by impulsive agents who are sophisticated (i.e., foresee future self-control 
failures) rather than naïve (i.e., do not anticipate future self-control problems) (D. Laibson, 
2015; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). However, these accounts do not distinguish between 
different aspects of metacognition such as metacognitive bias (the degree to which agents over- 
or underestimate their impulsiveness) and metacognitive accuracy (the accurateness of an 
agent’s subjective self-control beliefs). To inform these economic models, and to ground them 
on more elaborated concepts of metacognition, we therefore tested the roles of metacognitive 
bias and accuracy in moderating the relationship between objective impulsiveness and 
precommitment. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Eighty-two healthy heterosexual males (mean age = 22.6 years, age range 18-26 years) 
volunteered in the study after having given informed consent. Participants were reimbursed 
with 50 Swiss francs for their participation. A-priori power analyses suggested that a sample of 
80 participants is required to achieve a power of 80% (alpha = 5%), assuming a moderate 
correlation (r=0.3) between impulsiveness and willingness to precommit.  
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Stimuli and task design 
Precommitment task. Participants performed the precommitment and willpower 
conditions of the precommitment task in the same way as in Experiment 1. In addition, we 
employed two further control conditions (Figure 1): the choice condition served to control for 
the possibility that an individual’s decision not to precommit in the pre-delay phase of the 
precommitment condition might result from two different motivations, either an aversion 
against removing choice options or a preference for the SS over the LL reward. To distinguish 
between these two possibilities, the choice condition offered both the SS and the LL reward for 
selection in the pre-delay phase. Participants received the chosen reward after the indicated 
delay without having the possibility to reverse their choice. Choice behaviour in this condition 
thus assessed individual preferences for (binding choices of) LL over SS rewards in the pre-
delay phase. Note that it was not necessary to control for this potential confound in Experiment 
1 because we examined differences in the willingness to precommit between post-test and pre-
test sessions. 
In addition, we also controlled for participants’ preference for signalling (to oneself 
and/or the experimenter) patience by making non-binding choices of LL rewards (opt-out 
condition). Similar to precommitment and choice trials, opt-out trials started with a pre-delay 
phase in which participants chose either to see the SS reward immediately after the pre-delay 
phase, or to have the free choice between the LL and the SS reward during the delay phase. In 
contrast to the precommitment and choice condition, it was therefore not possible to make 
binding choices of LL rewards in this condition. We assessed whether the possibility of making 
binding LL reward choices in the precommitment condition increased the probability of LL 
reward deliveries relative to the opt-out condition where no binding choices were possible. 
Thus, the opt-out condition allowed us to determine the efficiency of precommitment as self-
control strategy. 
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Impulsiveness and confidence ratings. To test whether sophisticated impulsive 
individuals show the strongest precommitment demand, participants performed a rating task in 
which we asked them how likely they believed to be able to wait for the LL reward in the 
willpower condition. Participants rated their likelihood of waiting for the LL reward instead of 
choosing the SS reward separately for the three delays (4s, 7s, and 10s) on a scale that ranged 
from 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely). These ratings thus provided a measure of an 
individual’s impulsiveness beliefs that could be compared with the actual impulsiveness as 
observed in the willpower condition. After each impulsiveness rating, participants also rated 
their confidence regarding their impulsiveness beliefs on a scale from 0 (not confident at all) to 
10 (very confident).  
 
Procedure  
Participants obtained detailed task instructions and performed 6 trials of each condition 
of the precommitment task (precommitment, choice, opt-out, willpower) as practice. The 
practice blocks were followed by the impulsiveness rating task. Then, participants performed a 
total of 4 blocks per task condition in randomized order, with each block containing 6 trials 
(with balanced numbers of 4, 7, and 10 s delays).  
 
Data analysis 
Comparisons between conditions of the precommitment task (choices in the pre-delay 
phases or outcomes after the delay phases of each trial) were conducted with paired-samples t-
tests. In addition, we used general linear models (GLMs) to test the relationships between 
willingness to precommit, observed impulsive control (willpower condition), and self-reported 
impulsive control (impulsiveness ratings). To disentangle willingness to precommit from 
preference for LL over SS rewards (measured by the choice condition), we regressed 
precommitment decisions in the precommitment conditions on decisions in the choice 
Sophisticated impulsiveness and precommitment 17 
 
condition. The resulting (unstandardized) residuals of this regression capture the unconfounded 
individual willingness to precommit. We then aimed to distinguish between two potential 
driving forces of the willingness to precommit: metacognitive bias and metacognitive accuracy. 
As measure of metacognitive bias, we subtracted observed impulsive control (%LL outcomes 
willpower condition) from the self-reported impulsive control (ratings). This score is zero if 
participants correctly estimated their impulsiveness (self-reported = observed impulse control), 
positive if they are too optimistic regarding their impulse control (self-reported > observed 
impulse control), and negative if they are too pessimistic (observed > self-reported impulse 
control). As measure of metacognitive accuracy, we computed the absolute value of 
metacognitive bias: the smaller the absolute difference between self-reported and observed 
control, the more accurately can participants estimate their true impulsiveness. To disentangle 
the impacts of metacognitive bias and accuracy, we computed two separate GLMs regressing 
precommitment residuals on fixed effect predictors for Observed impulse control, Confidence 
(to control for participants’ confidence in their ratings), Metacognitive bias or accuracy, and all 
interaction terms. Parameters were estimated using restricted maximum likelihood estimations 
as implemented in SPSS. 
  
Results 
As for Experiment 1, we first validated the effectiveness of our experimental 
manipulations in the precommitment task. An ANOVA suggested that the number of LL 
outcomes significantly differed between the four experimental conditions, F(3, 243) = 20.88, p 
< 0.001, eta2partial = 0.205. We replicated the finding that the number of LL reward outcomes at 
the end of the delay phases was significantly higher in the precommitment condition (71%) than 
in the willpower condition (60%), t(81) = 7.15, p < 0.001. The precommitment condition also 
increased LL reward outcomes compared to the choice (64%) and opt-out (62%) conditions, 
both t > 4.57, p < 0.001, suggesting that the possibility to restrict one’s access to temptations 
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increased the likelihood of obtaining LL reward relative to conditions where precommitment 
was not possible. We moreover observed a higher number of LL outcomes in the choice 
compared with the willpower condition, t(81) = 2.95, p = 0.004, whereas the comparisons of 
the opt-out with the choice and willpower conditions yielded no significant results, both t < 
1.65, p > 0.10 (Figure 3A and Table 5).  
Next we investigated the prediction that sophisticated impulsive individuals (i.e., 
individuals who believe to be impulsive and actually are) have the strongest preference for 
precommitment. This hypothesis can be tested directly by assessing how observed impulse 
control and metacognitive accuracy (i.e., the difference between self-reported and observed 
impulse control) interact in motivating precommitment decisions. For that purpose, we analysed 
precommitment choices (after controlling for preference for LL outcomes in the choice 
condition; Figure 3B-D) with a GLM including predictors for Observed impulse control, 
Metacognitive accuracy, Confidence, and the interaction terms. While this analysis yielded no 
main effect of Observed impulse control, t < 1, p = 0.66, we found a significant Observed 
impulse control × Metacognitive accuracy interaction, beta = 0.08, t(74) = 2.18, p = 0.03. To 
resolve this interaction, we split our sample into four equal groups based on their observed 
impulse control scores. In the group with lowest impulse control, individuals were more likely 
to precommit if their metacognitive accuracy was close to zero, beta = 0.004, t(20) = 2.15, p = 
0.04, i.e. if they were aware of their impulsiveness. By contrast, the less impulsive groups 
showed no significant relationship between metacognition and willingness to precommit, all t 
< 1.12, all p > 0.27 (Figure 3E/F). The finding that increased metacognitive awareness of one’s 
impulsivity moderates the relationship between impulsiveness and precommitment is consistent 
with the assumptions of the sophisticated impulsiveness account.  
In addition, we also tested for the possibility that precommitment decisions are driven 
by the degree to which participants over- or underestimate their impulsiveness (metacognitive 
bias) rather than by metacognitive accuracy. We therefore re-computed the above described 
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GLM on willingness to precommit, replacing the predictor Metacognitive accuracy with 
Metacognitive bias. This GLM showed no significant effects, all t < 1.52, all p > 0.13. Thus, 
our data suggest that metacognitive accuracy, rather than metacognitive bias, contributes to 
precommitment decisions. However, we would like to note that our measures for metacognitive 
bias and accuracy were strongly correlated, r = 0.88, p < 0.001, because participants generally 
tended to overestimate their impulse control abilities (independence would require that in the 
mean participants neither over- nor underestimate their impulse control). We thus refrain from 
drawing inferences regarding a stronger contribution of metacognitive accuracy relative to bias 
in motivating precommitment. In any case, our results support the hypothesized modulatory 
role of metacognition for precommitment. 
Finally, we assessed the specificity of our results for binding precommitment choices 
by regressing non-binding LL reward choices in the opt-out condition on predictors for 
Observed impulse control, Metacognitive accuracy, Confidence, and the interaction terms 
(again controlling for LL reward preferences). This GLM yielded no significant effects, all t < 




The data from Experiment 2 provide evidence for a moderating effect of metacognition 
on willingness to precommit, with impulsive (as compared to patient) individuals showing a 
stronger precommitment demand if they are aware of their impulsiveness. Thus, our findings 
provide empirical support for central assumptions of the sophisticated impulsiveness account 
of precommitment (D. Laibson, 2015; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; Rachlin & Green, 1972; 
Thaler & Shefrin, 1981).  
We note that both Experiments 1 and 2 used intertemporal choice tasks with erotic 
reinforcers. One might thus question whether our conclusions can be generalized to other types 
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or domains of self-control, e.g. involving money. Experiment 3 therefore assessed whether the 
contribution of metacognitive awareness of one’s impulsivity to precommitment is robust to 
choice situations involving monetary decisions. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
In Experiments 3, we employed an intertemporal choice task with decisions between 
monetary rewards at different temporal delays. To generalize our findings to different measures 
of metacognition, we assessed awareness of one’s time preference based on confidence ratings 
after each intertemporal choice. The degree to which confident choices are less noisy than 
choices with low subjective confidence represents an established measure of the metacognitive 
awareness of one’s economic preferences (De Martino, Fleming, Garrett, & Dolan, 2013). 
Experiment 3 therefore allowed assessing the robustness of the results of Experiment 2 to 
alternative measures of self-control and metacognitive accuracy. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
30 healthy volunteers (mean age = 23.1 years, age range 20-28 years, 20 female) 
participated in the study after having given informed consent. Participants were reimbursed 
with 20 Swiss francs for their participation plus a bonus depending on their choices (see below).  
 
Stimuli and task design 
Confidence task. Participants performed a monetary intertemporal choice task where 
they made decisions between an immediately available SS reward (0-10 Swiss francs today, in 
steps of 1 Swiss franc) and a LL reward that was fixed to 10 Swiss francs and was delivered 
after a delay of 1-180 days (using the following delays: 1, 10, 20, 40, 80, 120, and 180 days). 
The SS and LL reward options were randomly presented on the left or right screen side. 
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Participants had to indicate their choice by pressing the left (for the left option) or right arrow 
key (for the right option) on a keyboard within 4 s. After each choice, participants had to 
indicate their confidence that they made the correct choice on a rating scale from 0 (low 
confidence) to 20 (high confidence) within a response interval of 3 s (Figure 4A). 
Precommitment task. As for the confidence task, participants made choices between 
monetary rewards delivered in the future. One option consisted of a fixed monetary reward of 
10 Swiss francs that was delivered after delays of 29-208 days (precommitment option; e.g., 
“10 Swiss francs in 38 days”; Figure 4B). When choosing this option, participants received the 
10 Swiss francs after the given delay without having the possibility to reverse their choice. The 
other option (free-choice option) entailed an SS reward of 0-10 Swiss francs delivered after 28 
days and a LL reward that was identical to the precommitment option (e.g., “5 Swiss francs in 
28 days” or “10 Swiss francs in 38 days”). If participants decided for this free-choice option, 
they were re-contacted by the experimenter via email after 28 days and were asked to make a 
choice between the SS and LL rewards, with the delays adjusted for the bygone 20 days (in the 
current example, “5 Swiss francs today” or “10 Swiss francs in 10 days”). If they decided for 
the precommitment option, they received an information about the chosen option via email after 
28 days without having the option to reverse their choice. The free-choice option thus allowed 
participants to reverse their current preference after 28 days, whereas with the precommitment 
option they made a binding choice for the LL reward. 
 
Procedure  
Participants performed the confidence task and the precommitment task in 
counterbalanced order. The confidence and precommitment tasks included a total of 168 and 
108 trials, respectively. At the end of the experiment, one trial of the two tasks was randomly 
selected and the corresponding amount was paid after the given delay. 
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Data analysis 
Data were analysed with mixed GLMs (MGLMs) as implemented in SPSS. The 
confidence task allowed us to measure an individual participant’s metacognitive awareness of 
her time preferences. For that purpose, we first estimated each individual’s preferences (as 
revealed by her choices) by fitting a standard hyperbolic discount function to the choices in the 
confidence task (equation 1): 
(Equation 1) SVLL = LL reward magnitude / (1 + k × delay) 
 Where SVLL is the discounted subjective value of the LL reward and k is a participant-
specific constant indicating the steepness of the hyperbolic discount function (“discount 
factor”). To translate subjective value into choices, we fitted the following softmax function to 
each participant’s choices: 
(Equation 2) P(choice of LL option) = 1 / (1 + e-βtemp × (SVLL – SVSS)) 
This function captures the likelihood of choosing the LL reward option as a function of 
the difference between the subjective value of the LL reward option (SVLL) and the SS reward 
option (SVSS). The free inverse temperature parameter βtemp captures how strongly participants 
relied on this value difference and temperature can be interpreted as noise. Parameters were 
estimated using maximum likelihood methods as implemented in Matlab (function fmincon). 
To measure metacognitive awareness of one’s time preferences, we followed the approach 
described by De Martino et al. (2013). We first computed the difference between the value of 
the SS reward and the subjective value of the LL reward (SVLL – SVSS) based on the individual 
discount factors. We then regressed each individual participant’s choices of LL versus SS 
rewards on z-standardized predictors for the subjective value difference (SVLL – SVSS), the 
confidence ratings, and the interaction term. The interaction term indicates the degree to which 
participants are aware of decision noise in the choice process and thus reflects a measures of 
metacognitive accuracy: the stronger the interaction between decision noise and confidence 
ratings, the better participants know their time preferences (metacognitive accuracy) (De 
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Martino et al., 2013). We note that, contrary to Experiment 2, this procedure allowed measuring 
only metacognitive accuracy but does not provide an established measure of metacognitive bias. 
Based on this, we examined whether awareness of one’s impulsivity predicted the 
willingness to precommit. As in Experiment 2, to disentangle the impact of precommitment 
demand from preference of LL outcomes on precommitment decisions, we first conducted a 
logistic regression that regressed choices in the precommitment task (0 = free-choice option, 1 
= precommitment option) on the value difference between LL and SS options on each trial 
(using MGLMs as implemented in SPSS). The resulting residuals thus indicate the willingness 
to precommit after correcting for the preference for LL over SS rewards. These residuals were 
then submitted to a MGLM, which regressed them on predictors for Metacognitive accuracy 
(obtained from the confidence task), Commitment demand, and the interaction term. 
Commitment demand was computed by subtracting the value difference between SS and LL 
reward from the current perspective from the value difference between these options from the 
perspective in 28 days (when participants had to make a definite choice between the options). 
The higher this difference, the higher the likelihood of preference reversals (i.e., that a 
participant prefers the LL reward today and the SS reward in 28 days) and thus the potential 
benefit from precommitting. Based on the findings in Experiment 2, we expected to observe 
that higher metacognitive awareness of precommitment demand was associated with stronger 
preference for precommitment. 
 
Results 
An MGLM on the willingness to precommit revealed a negative effect of commitment 
demand, beta = -0.04, t(8904) = 2.56, p = 0.01, suggesting that participants with poor 
metacognition (Metacognitive accuracy = 0) were in fact less willing to precommit with 
increasing risk of preference reversals. This points to the subjective costliness of restricting 
one’s action space and that participants who were not sensitive to the potential benefits of 
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precommitment (due to their poor metacognition) were willing to precommit to the LL option 
predominantly when having a strong preference for the LL option. Importantly, we also 
observed a significant Commitment demand × Metacognitive accuracy interaction, beta = 0.04, 
t(9943) = 2.78, p = 0.005, indicating that increasing metacognitive skills strengthened the 
impact of commitment demand on choices to precommit. For illustration purpose, we conducted 
follow-up analyses by splitting the variable Metacognitive accuracy into quartiles. While 
commitment demand did not significantly predict precommitment in individuals with low-to-
moderate metacognitive skills (lowest three quartiles), all beta > -0.04, all t < 1.67, all p > 0.17, 
participants with high metacognitive skills (highest quartile) increasingly preferred 
precommitment with higher commitment demand, beta = 0.06, t(17) = 2.83, p = 0.01 (Figure 
4C). Again, the finding that metacognition increases the sensitivity to the expected benefit from 
precommitting is consistent with the predictions of the sophisticated impulsiveness account.  
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 suggest that metacognitive awareness of one’s risk of 
preference reversals motivates precommitment choices. This replicates and extends the findings 
of Experiment 2, providing evidence for the robustness and generalizability of our conclusions 




Restricting one’s access to temptations is an effective strategy to protect against impulse 
control failure (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002; Bryan et al., 2010; Ladouceur et al., 2012; 
Schwartz et al., 2014). One account proposed a link between precommitment and the meta-
cognitive awareness of impulsive agents of their impulsiveness (Kurth-Nelson & Redish, 2010, 
2012; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; Rachlin & Green, 1972; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). However, 
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empirical evidence for central assumptions of this framework was so far missing. Putting the 
theory on firmer ground, Experiment 1 corroborates the assumption that impulsiveness drives 
the demand for precommitment: reducing cognitive control resources causally increased both 
impulsiveness in intertemporal choices and the willingness to precommit. In addition, 
Experiments 2 and 3 corroborate the claimed moderating impact of sophistication:  
metacognitive accuracy strengthens the preference for precommitment with increasing 
objective impulsiveness (Experiment 2) or risk of preference reversals (Experiment 3). To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical demonstration that sophistication matters for 
precommitment, suggesting that sophisticated individuals prefer to restrict their access to 
temptations in order to protect themselves against impulse control failures. These findings are 
also consistent with neural data showing that the frontopolar cortex, a brain region related to 
metacognition, plays a crucial role in precommitment decisions (Crockett et al., 2013; 
Soutschek et al., 2017). Together, our results provide evidence for a crucial role of 
impulsiveness and sophistication for motivating precommitment choices. 
The finding that metacognitive awareness of impulsiveness drives precommitment 
informs and may refine theoretical models of precommitment. It provides empirical support for 
the sophisticated impulsiveness account of precommitment (Kurth-Nelson & Redish, 2012; D. 
Laibson, 2015; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981) but speaks against an 
alternative account assuming that precommitment decisions themselves require impulse control 
(Noor, 2007). We note that a further model claims that precommitment is motivated not by the 
avoidance of control lapses but by the elimination of the subjective costs of exerting control 
(Gul & Pesendorfer, 2001), a view that is supported by recent evidence (Toussaert, 2018). In 
analogy to the sophisticated impulsiveness model, metacognitive awareness of subjective self-
control costs might moderate the willingness to precommit in the Gul-Pesendorfer account. 
Because it is plausible to assume that high impulsiveness is associated with high perceived self-
control costs (Jimura, Chushak, Westbrook, & Braver, 2018), the sophisticated impulsiveness 
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and the Gul-Pesendorfer account might be considered as alternative formulations for the role 
of metacognitive beliefs for precommitment, rather than being incompatible models of 
precommitment. 
The current results have implications for the design of precommitment devices. 
Precommitment devices are applied in many different domains from the financial sector to 
psychiatry (Bryan et al., 2010). Our findings suggest that increasing the subjective awareness 
of one’s impulsivity might be an effective means to motivate particularly impulsive agents to 
voluntarily restrict their access to temptations. Because impulse control deficits characterize 
disorders such as addiction or obesity (Hasler, 2012; Monterosso, Piray, & Luo, 2012), there 
might be untapped potential for improving these deficits by advising patients on how to restrict 
their access to the source of temptation. Yet, it has been noted that even many individuals who 
would strongly benefit from self-restrictions decide against precommitment (D. Laibson, 2015). 
Our results suggest that impulsiveness alone without awareness of one’s susceptibility to 
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Tables 
Table 1. Mean LL outcomes and precommitment decisions (in percent) in Experiment 1. 
Standard errors of the mean are in brackets. 
  Precommitment condition Willpower condition 
















4 s 86 (4) 79 (5) 30 (7) 82 (5) 
7 s 69 (6) 58 (6) 26 (6) 62 (5) 







4 s 89 (4) 85 (5) 13 (6) 84 (5) 
7 s 69 (6) 58 (6) 19 (6) 56 (7) 











4 s 81 (4) 71 (4) 22 (6) 72 (4) 
7 s 67 (5) 57 (5) 19 (6) 61 (5) 







4 s 83 (4) 77 (4) 20 (6) 62 (5) 
7 s 67 (6) 63 (6) 15 (5) 51 (6) 
10 s 61 (6) 54 (6) 15 (5) 50 (6) 
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Table 2. Results of the 2 (Group) × 2 (Condition) × 3 (Delay) ANCOVA on post-test 
behaviour in the precommitment and willpower conditions in Experiment 1 while controlling 
for pre-test baseline differences in these conditions. 
Effect F p-value eta2partial 
Group 0.01 0.93 0.000 
Condition 3.50 0.07 0.045 
Delay 37.07 <0.001 0.331 
Group × Condition 6.44 0.01 0.079 
Group × Delay 7.88 0.001 0.095 
Condition × Delay 1.97 0.14 0.026 
Group × Condition × Delay 0.21 0.81 0.003 
 
 
Table 3. Results of the 2 (Group) × 3 (Delay) ANCOVA on post-test behaviour in the 
willpower condition in Experiment 1 while controlling for pre-test baseline differences in this 
condition. 
Effect F p-value eta2partial 
Group 2.28 0.14 0.029 
Delay 21.68 <0.001 0.222 
Group × Delay 6.82 0.001 0.082 
 
 
Table 4. Results of the 2 (Group) × 3 (Delay) ANCOVA on post-test behaviour in the 
precommitment condition in Experiment 1 while controlling for pre-test baseline differences 
in this condition. 
Effect F p-value eta2partial 
Group 1.89 0.17 0.024 
Delay 34.62 <0.001 0.313 
Group × Delay 5.22 0.006 0.064 
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Table 5. Mean LL outcomes (in percent) and decisions in Experiment 2, separately for 
decision phase, delay phase, and combined decision and delay phase. Standard errors of the 
mean are in brackets. 





(decision + delay phase) 
Precommitment 60 (3) 26 (3) 71 (3) 
Choice 64 (3)   
Opt-out 62 (3) 90 (2)  
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Experimental conditions in the precommitment task. In all conditions, participants 
chose between an immediately available smaller-sooner (SS) reward and a larger-later (LL) 
reward delivered after 4, 7, or 10 s. Individualized stimulus sets of erotic images served as 
rewards. In Experiment 1, participants performed only the precommitment and willpower 
conditions, whereas in Experiment 2 we administered also the choice and opt-out conditions. 
(A) In the precommitment condition, participants decided either to have the free choice between 
SS and LL reward during the delay phase, or to precommit to the LL reward; if participants 
precommitted, the SS reward was removed from the choice set during the delay, such that they 
could not reverse their decision. (B) The willpower condition consisted of the delay phase only. 
Participants could choose the immediately displayed SS reward image anytime while waiting 
for the LL reward delivery. This condition allowed measuring individual differences in 
willpower, i.e. the capacity to resist SS rewards while waiting for LL rewards. (C) In the choice 
condition (which controls for participants’ preferences for LL over SS rewards), participants 
made a decision between SS and LL reward and received the chosen reward after the indicated 
delay. Thus, they could not reverse their decisions during the delay phase. (D) In the opt-out 
condition participants also decided between SS and LL reward before the delay. However, if 
they chose the LL option they could still reverse their decision and switch to the SS image 
during the delay (non-binding LL reward choices).  
 
Figure 2. Experimental procedure and results of Experiment 1. (A) Participants performed the 
precommitment and the willpower condition of the precommitment task (Figure 1) in both a 
pre-test and a post-test experimental session. In-between, participants performed a letter-
version of the n-back task in either a 3-back (working memory group) or a 0-back condition 
(control group). (B) Participants gave significantly more correct responses in the 0-back than 
in the 3-back condition, suggesting that the latter was cognitively more demanding. (C, D) 
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Reducing the availability of cognitive control resources (working memory vs. control group) 
significantly (C) reduced impulse control in the willpower condition at the shortest delay and 
at the same time (D) increased voluntary self-restriction in the precommitment condition for 
long delays. Error bars represent standard error of the mean, asterisks indicate significant effects 
(p < 0.05). 
 
Figure 3. Results of Experiment 2. (A) The frequency of LL reward outcomes increased 
significantly in the precommitment condition relative to all other conditions, providing 
evidence for the effectiveness of precommitment as self-control device. (B, C, D) Correlations 
between precommitment choices in the precommitment condition, LL decisions in the choice 
condition, and LL outcomes in the willpower conditions. To control for the impact of LL reward 
preference on precommitment decisions, we computed the residuals from regressing 
precommitment decisions on LL decisions in the choice condition. (E, F) More impulsive 
individuals were increasingly willing to precommit with better metacognitive awareness of 
impulsiveness (metacognitive accuracy scores closer to 0). For illustration purpose, we split our 
sample into more impulsive (E, lowest quartile) and more patient (F, highest quartile) 
individuals based on the percentage of LL outcomes in the willpower condition. 
 
Figure 4. Experimental paradigm and results of Experiment 3. (A) In the confidence task, 
participants performed a monetary intertemporal decision task. After each choice, they rated 
their confidence in whether the choice made was the best decision. As measure of metacognitive 
accuracy, we computed the interaction term between participants’ confidence rating and 
decision noise. (B) In the precommitment task, participants decided between making a binding 
choice for a LL reward (e.g., 10 Swiss francs in 38 days) and postponing the choice to the future 
(e.g., 5 Swiss francs in 28 days or 10 Swiss francs in 38 days). If participants precommitted to 
the LL reward, they received the monetary amount after the indicated delay without having the 
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possibility to reverse their choice. If participants postponed the decision, they were re-contacted 
after 28 days and then had to make a choice between the SS (5 Swiss francs today) and LL 
rewards (10 Swiss francs in 10 days). (C) On trials with high commitment demand (indicating 
increased risk of preference reversals), individuals with high metacognitive accuracy made 
more binding LL reward choices than individuals who were less aware of their time preferences. 
As for Experiment 2, we split our sample into individuals with low (lowest quartiles) and high 
metacognitive accuracy (highest quartile) for illustration purpose. 
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
